According to a recent report by defense analyst organization IHS Jane’s, India and China have accused each other of violating the Line of Actual Control (LAC) 334 and 410 times respectively since January. Against such a backdrop, President Xi Jinping boldly promised during a recent visit to Delhi, “China has the determination to work with India through friendly consultations to settle the boundary question at an early date.”
However, do not expect this to happen quickly, as indicated by another comment from Xi: “We also have the sincerity to work with India to maintain peace and tranquility in the border areas before we are finally able to settle the boundary question.”
Ironically, these fine promises were issued while People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops were on a prolonged incursion over the LAC at an altitude of 4,450m in the vicinity of Chumar in Jammu and Kashmir.
Nor is Xi the first Chinese president to utter such solemn pledges. Indian ears have heard such sentiments before, but the status quo remains. Long-standing border disputes have been an intractable thorn in the flesh preventing better ties between the two regional powers.
A flag meeting between Indian and Chinese military commanders on 25 September defused the 18-day standoff. Each side agreed to desist from military construction and to draw down their 1,000 troops. This was the second major incident in this location in the past 16 months.
“This is not the first time that the issue of border incursions has occurred at the time of a high-level visit. The ambiguous nature of the LAC, and improved ability of the PLA to undertake patrols in disputed regions, complicates matters,” assessed Rukmani Gupta, senior analyst, Armed Forces, IHS Jane’s Aerospace and Defence.
Intrusions are triggered by differing perceptions as to where individual borders actually are. IHS Jane’s further reported, “Senior Indian Army officers…privately concede that such “intrusions” are “militarily essential” for both sides in order to maintain their territorial claims ahead of an eventual border settlement.” Additionally, one source familiar with Chinese military strategy told ANI there is an “established Chinese pattern of nibbling away at Indian territory so as to create a new norm”.
China trumpets the Border Defense Cooperation Agreement (BDCA), signed on 23 October 2013, as a mechanism to defuse border incidents. However, it does not remove the root cause of tensions – the fact that the 3,440km frontier is not clearly demarcated to the satisfaction of both parties.
Nevertheless, it will be mutually beneficial to both countries to overcome this hurdle. “The political will to improve bilateral relations exists and, for bilateral ties to improve, progress must be made on the border issue. As such there is little rationale for China to not want to resolve the border disputes with India,” Gupta told ANI.
However, in Indian minds the dispute became more sharply focused when Xi ordered his troops to “improve their combat readiness and sharpen their ability to win a regional war in the age of information technology” whilst speaking at a ceremony to promote three PLA generals. It is informative that Indian media have been the only ones to jump on Xi’s statement, of a type that is quite routine for the president.
Relations with a number of neighbors have deteriorated dramatically since Xi came to power, including Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam, North Korea and Myanmar. In June, Beijing also claimed the future of Taiwan “should be determined by 1.3 billion Chinese people”. China has trouble on its home front as well, with Hong Kong citizens currently on the streets protesting Beijing’s refusal to grant genuine universal suffrage. Additionally, ethnic minorities such as Uighurs have felt increasingly marginalized.
It would be a brave Beijing leader – considering all the confrontations going on right now – to foment trouble along the Indian border as well. Andrei Chang, editor of Kanwa Asian Defence, wrote: “When solving disputes with other countries, any nation would try to avoid creating enemies on all fronts simultaneously. Even if there are differences, they should be addressed one by one rather than hitting out in all directions and making new enemies in the process.”
Nevertheless, there is a discernible trend in Xi’s administration style. It is clear the military’s influence on Chinese diplomacy has steadily risen. The gun is taking control. Chang speculates “this new characteristic of Chinese diplomacy probably originates from Xi Jinping ‘s experience in working in the Chinese armed forces, and that Xi also needs to win greater support from them.”
China feels confident about its land borders. For example, Li Qinggong, deputy secretary general of the China Council for National Security Policy Studies, said, “China has built an iron bastion in its border region. The major concern lies at sea.”
“On issues of territory and sovereignty, China’s position is firm and clear. We will not take anything that isn’t ours, but we will defend every inch of territory that belongs to us,” proclaimed Wang Yi, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, earlier this year.
Such talk demonstrates China will not relinquish any territorial claims, while the month-long Sino-Indian War of 1962 shows India must be prepared to stand up to Chinese incursions.
In India there is corresponding anxiety the PLA is building up its military presence in Tibet. Gupta commented: “Indian concerns regarding the so-called ‘Chinese military build-up’ in Tibet relate to the improvement of infrastructure on the Tibetan Plateau, which has permitted the PLA to deploy resources in areas where it was previously difficult to do so.”
Extensive infrastructure development is indeed occurring on both sides of the mountainous border, with China undoubtedly stealing a march over its neighbor. However, reputable military analysis suggests the PLA is still struggling to conduct training – let alone any operations – on the plateau. For instance, a presumed HQ-9 surface-to-air missile facility was established at Xigaze Air Force Base in 2009. To date, no actual missiles are believed to have been deployed there yet.
Additionally, small batches of fighter aircraft such as the J-10 and J-11 rotate to Tibet only temporarily. Analysis shows detachments stay only several months at a time. The logistic support of units and equipment in Tibet is clearly still a major problem for the PLA owing to altitude sickness, dangerous roads, snowstorms, floods, freezing temperatures and landslides.
Interestingly, India could be seen as having a decisive advantage through the stationing of Su-30MKI fighters at Tespur and Chabua Air Bases. Thus, the Indian Air Force (IAF) has the ability to effectively confront PLA third-generation fighters in the region. Privthi short-range ballistic missiles are deployed, as are land-based BrahMos cruise missiles of the army. India has the ability to strike China’s main air bases in Tibet although, conversely, China has the ability to do the same against IAF bases.
The Indian Army is expanding its 17th Mountain Strike Corps too, although it is far from a formidable force right now. Despite promises from the Chinese president, India is very prudent in fortifying its presence along the border. Chinese leaders have shown, in previous decades and in the current administration, that actions ultimately speak louder than words.