The candles lit in the memory of the 132 innocent children brutally slaughtered on December 16, 2014 have burnt out; the flowers have begun to decay, social media is limping to other issues, the children have been buried, the Friday prayers offered.
Politicians, newspaper editors and TV talk-show anchors and hosts have exhausted the dictionary for words to articulate the tragedy that has little parallel and to promise that the tragedy will be avenged.
Pakistan, over the years, has been numbed by endemic violence and mass attacks- Peshawar church 2013- 80 Christians dead; Quetta snooker hall 2013-120 Shia Hazaras dead; Lahore, May 2010, 80 Ahmadis dead, to name a few. Despite this, the Peshawar attack on the Army School was in a new league, shocking not just the country but the world.
What does the attack signify?
First, the home-grown terror in Pakistan has escalated to a new level-that of competitive brutality. The attack was reminiscent of ISIS-style attacks in its sheer brutality and mindlessness and to instill fear in the public and security forces. That’s why the terrorists did not take hostages or make any demands. They just started killing children on entering the building. Nor did the children die as a result of “collateral damage”. They were deliberately targeted.
Second, a blow back was to be expected ever since the Army had launched Operation Zarb-e-Azb in mid-June 2014. Security had been tightened in Army Schools across the country especially after interrogation of a few captured terrorists from North Waziristan had revealed plans of targeting such schools.
So, was there a security failure? Can it happen again?
Third, the attack on the school was an act of vicious revenge because as the TTP put it “army targets our families. We want them to feel our pain.” It was also meant to weaken the determination of the Pakistani government and armed forces against their campaign by warning of the tremendous human costs to the military offensive.
Fourth, the attack calls into question how effectively has the capability of the TTP to strike at will been actually degraded, the ‘success’ of Zarb-e-Azb notwithstanding. Some have stated that the attack on a soft target was a sign of TTP weakness and declining fortunes. Others have held that the Haqqani network has been targeted for the first time and according to the US, it has been “fractured.” This, of course, is debatable, since the attack was not by the Haqqanis but by the TTP.
The Pakistan Response
The attack has reinforced the will of Pak leadership to continue the fight as evidenced by the immediate reaction to launch air strikes in FATA and to lift the ban on implementation of the death penalty.
Statistics of those killed in air strikes may bring a certain amount of relief and a feeling of being avenged, but will hanging those on death row deter the TTP and other terrorists?
How can the death penalty deter a suicide bomber or a suicidal one? The only real benefit would be to prevent attempted mass jailbreaks and prisoner exchanges.
Unfortunately, the civilian government doesn’t seem to have a plan to deal with terrorism. Counter-terrorism remains a low priority of the government as neither the required funds have been provided to the National Internal Security Policy (NISP) nor has the PM chaired a meeting of the National Counter-Terrorism Authority (NACTA) even once.
It is as if the Government has abdicated the responsibility of counter-terrorism also to the Army. Already weakened by Imran Khan’s agitation, the government is in danger of losing whatever credibility is left in the aftermath of this attack.
Lessons for Pakistan?
Much has been said that this could well be Pakistan’s 9/11 moment, a game changer, a watershed, a line crossed etc.
For this to happen Pakistan would have to do at least three things.
First, strong arm methods while necessary, will not cut to the chase and provide a sustainable solution unless these measures are part of a comprehensive strategy. Without such a holistic strategy, Pakistan is bound to lurch from one such attack to the next.
Second, will the Pakistani state continue to be in a state of denial about the terror factories that they have bred over the decades? In the past mass attacks either the Shia Hazaras, Christians or Ahmadis were killed. There was outrage but no sustained action to get to the bottom of the problem. This time the victims are Pashtuns, many would be children of Army personnel. Will this impel the Pak state to do something?
Third, while Nawaz Sharif has said that the country would cease to discriminate between good and bad Taliban, such is the skepticism that most question whether even now the Establishment would adopt a blanket policy against all non-state actors.
Operations against bad Taliban in FATA, does not square off with the sheltering of Afghan Taliban in Quetta, a host of sectarian organisations in Punjab and so-called Kashmiri/anti-India Jihadi outfits elsewhere.
Pakistan will have to accept that this war is about its own survival and can be won only when terrorism is targeted not selectively but across the board and everyone agrees who is a terrorist.
This is indeed a tall task and the jury is out whether Pakistan can walk the talk.
Salim Haq is an independent international affairs and security expert specializing in South Asia. He tweets at @haqsalim6
—ANI